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The Perilous Necessity: Non-Legal
Materials in a Family Law Course*
ROBERT J. LEVYt
Even the most casual observer should be aware that we
are living through a period of intense interest by law profes-
sors in the behavioral sciences. No volume of the Journal of
Legal Education is published without at least one essay on a
law school program, a design for cooperative research or a
criticism of the lawyers for paying no heed to their more
scientific brethren. A review of A.A.I.S. convention agendas
would indicate, I am sure, very few meetings without some
discussion of "Law and the Behavioral Sciences."' The inter-
est manifests itself in a variety of ways, 'but nowhere more
actively, nowhere more passionately and obdurately, than in
the preparation of teaching materials. In fact, all of this ac-
tivity is part of a "second explosion ' 2 of the interest. It is
striking that Professor Paulsen should be defending the "tra-
ditional" casebook by reference to Jacobs & Goebel 3P - since
Brainerd Currie's brilliant exposition of the initial "explosion"
highlighted the first edition of that casebook as one of the
prime examples of the then new and exciting effort to "co-
ordinate" law and the behavioral and social sciences. 4 And,
fProfessor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
*A paper presented at the Family Law Round Table at the Annual Meeting
of the Association of American Law Schools, Chicago, Ill., on Dec. 29, 1962.
Reprinted from the Journal of Legal Education, Volume XV, No. 4, by permission
from the Association of American Law Schools. Copyright, 1963, by the Associ-
ation of American Law Schools.
1. See, e.g., "'Law School Developments," 12 1. Legal Ed. 83-106 (1959)
(Speeches at 1958 meetings on the Law and Behavioral Science Program at Yale
Law School), "Law School Developments," 11 1. Legal Ed. 73-99 (1958) (Speeches
at 1957 meetings on the Law and Behavioral Sciences Project at University of
Pennsylvania Law School); Ass'n American Law Schools, Program, 1960 Annual
Meeting 24-25 (Law-Medicine Round Table Discussion: "Lawyer-Client Interviews:
Some Lessons from the Behavioral Sciences"); Ass'n American Law Schools, Pro-
gram, 1959 Annual Meeting 21-22 (Administrative Law Round Table Discussion:
"What Can Administrative Law Professors Learn from the Behavioral Sciences-
If Anything?").
2. Allen, "History, Empirical Research, and Law Reform: A Short Comment
on a Large Subject," 9 ]. Legal Ed. 335 (1956).
3. Jacobs & Goebel, Cases and Other Aaterials on Domestic Relations (4th
ed. 1961). I should note that, as it was presented, the burden of Professor Paul-
sen's address was that the extant non-traditional books are inadequate; we have no
choice, therefore, but to use one of the traditional efforts. That position is not too
far removed from the one presented here.
4. Currie, "The Materials of Law Study, III," 8 J. Legal Ed. 1 (1955).
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of course, it was the Columbia Law School's curriculum study
and revision which detonated the first explosion.
I call the coincidence striking because by any definition
of the term the current Jacobs & Goebel must be considered a
traditional book. When I peruse its contents my most vivid
image is of Miniver Cheevy, of whom, you will remember,
Edward Arlington Robinson wrote:
Miniver loved the Medici
albeit he had never seen one;
He would have sinned incessantly
could he have been one.
Miniver cursed the commonplace
and eyed a khaki suit with loathing;
He missed the mediaeval grace
of iron clothing.5
Select a section of the book at random and you may
discover that cruelty was not even a ground for divorce a.m.t.
in the classical canon law, but "when the English ecclesiastical
administration became independent of Rome, divorce a mensa
for cruelty became usual. The reasons for this change are
obscure "6 Despite the obscurity, a footnote continues:
"In proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights the ecclesi-
astical remedy for desertion, the so-called exceptio saevitae
(viz. justification on the ground of cruelty) could be inter-
posed. ' '7 Make no mistake. I am not a history-hater. Indeed,
I agree with Professor Allen's complaint that we have im-
properly neglected to include history as one of the social
sciences with which lawyers should be concerned.' But it does
seem proper, since we are talking of history, to recall Aris-
totle's belief in moderation.
In any case, I cite the evidence not to condemn but to
illustrate a metamorphosis. I was tempted to believe that my
feelings about Jacobs & Goebel were simply an example of
the new generation considering old-fashioned what was to its
predecessor a substantial, even revolutionary, advance. But
there is overwhelming evidence that the editorial policy has
been substantially revised. Consider the prefaces. In 1933
Professor Jacobs said:
5. Robinson, "Miniver Cheevy," Oxford Book of American Verse, 486-87
(Matthiessen ed. 1950).
6. Jacobs & Goebel, op. cit., supra, n. 3, at 428.
7. Id. at 428-29, n. 6.
8. Allen, supra, n. 2.
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Much new material must be presented for the consideration
of the student. For instance, it would be almost impossible for
a student to acquire even a working knowledge of current family
controls without a survey of the more pertinent non-legal evi-
dence. An attempt to confine the study to the strictly legal rules
would prove inadequate. ... The editor regrets that more non-
legal material could not be included.9
By 1953 Dean Kingsley was referring to the third edition as
a "reasonably traditional" casebook.1 0 The foreword attributed
to Professors Jacobs and Goebel in 1961 was in startling
contrast:
Because this book is designed to fit law students to deal as
lawyers with questions of domestic relations, we have not entered
as extensively as we might have into the sociology of the subject.
Enlightening as such studies often are, they have had to yield
place to technical matter. Many a litigant in the cases that follow
fell into difficulties because statutes were not carefully read or
because procedural problems were inexpertly handled. Such de-
ficiencies can be averted only by training in the close reading of
statutes, and in procedural detail. The opportunity for this we
have endeavored to provide."'
The metamorphosis reflects more than the interests and
temperament of the editor with primary responsibility; it is
as well symptomatic of a flux, a pulsation in our concern with
non-legal materials. Harry Kalven spoke of the "manic-de-
pressive quality of the law's efforts" ;12 Caleb Foote, of a
"repetition of the same cycle of fanaticism followed by fail-
ure."'" Whether the last period of "failure" was caused by
the "crusading" and "revolutionary" aspects of the first ex-
plosion we need not investigate;"4 it is sufficient to point out
that the current explosion seems to be better controlled, and
the shock troops are moving forward with more care and
less desire for a spectacular conquest.' 5
Without making any effort to predict the ultimate re-
sults of this explosion, it seems necessary to recognize that
Jacobs & Goebel's fourth child faces in a different direction
9. Jacobs, Cases and Materials on Domestic Relations, vii (1933).
10. Kingsley, Book Review, 5 1. Legal Ed. 400, 401 (1953).
11. Jacobs & Goebel, op. cit., supra, n. 3, at ix.
12. Kalven, "Some Comments on the Law and Behavioral Science Project at the
University of Pennsylvania," 11 1. Legal Ed. 94, 95 (1958).
13. Foote, "The Law and Behavioral Science Project at the University of
Pennsylvania: Family and Criminal Law," 11 1. Legal Ed. 80, 81 (1958).
14. See Kalven, supra, n. 12, at 95.
15. See, e.g., Levin, "The Law and Behavioral Science Project at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania: Evidence," 11 1. Legal Ed. 87 (1958); Foote, supra, n. 13;
Kalven, supra, n. 12.
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than the predominant Family Law casebook population (if
one may count among the births, editor-mothers either in
labor,-as Foote and Sander-or quick with child-as Gold-
stein and Katz). The children of this new generation cannot
be judged without reference to the shortcomings of their
"traditional" second cousins.
I
The first count of any indictment against the "traditional"
casebook should be its lack of an adequate sense of humor.
Professor Currie objected to the "humorless reviewer" who
begrudged the space given in a footnote of Jacobs' first edition
to Lord Neaves' verse on Gretna Green marriages.1 6 The
second edition only cited the verse ;17 by the third all mention
had been excised.'8 But this is a minor matter. I object to any
discussion of what is euphemistically called "Third Party In-
terference" which does not include Bedan v. Turney,' 9 an
action for criminal conversation in which the court described
the injury done by the defendant as an invasion of the husband's
exclusive right to beget his own children-and then held that
the husband's impotence was irrelevant. I object to any con-
sideration of paternity actions which does not include a
reference to Commonwealth of Virginia v. "Paul" Huffine-
a case in which the prosecuting attorney was embarrassed by
the report of a medical examination indicating that the
defendant was a female ; o or Woodbury v. Yeaton, 21 interpret-
ing Maine's rule that the mother's accusation during travail
is a condition precedent to maintaining a paternity action,
denied recovery to a mother whose child was delivered by
Caesarean section-since anaesthesia results in a complete loss
of sensation and, therefore, "no travail and no pains of
parturition in the ordinary sense of the term."2 I object to
16. Currie, supra, n. 4, at 37, n. 150.
17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 37, n. 156.
19. Bedan v. Turney, 99 Cal. 649, 34 P. 442 (1893).
20. Schatkin, "Paternity Proceedings-A Changing Concept," 42 J. Crim. L.,
C & P.S. 821, 824 (1952).
21. Woodbury v. Yeaton, 135 Me. 147, 151, 191 A. 278, 280 (1937).
22. Id. at 151, 191 A. at 280. Some poetic license has been taken
with the case. The court actually reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff
because she had not pleaded that she had given birth by Caesarean section and,
therefore, the defendant was not "apprised of the precise nature of the charge
against him. Id. at 153, 191 A. at 281.
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any case materials on sexual misconduct which do not include
the Minnesota statute making it a felony to carnally know a
bird in any manner; 23 or the Ohio statute which made it a
felony for any instructor in roller skating to seduce a female
pupil;24 or Williams v. State25 which reversed the convictions
of a young couple found copulating on a highway to the amuse-
ment of sundry passers-by, since the lewdness statute, pro-
hibiting indecent exposure in a public place, could not be
interpreted to include a highway in the absence of a showing
that it was being habitually travelled upon at the time and
place of the act. And I cannot accept any casebook presenta-
tion of the law of divorce which does not include Bohnel v.
Bohne, 26 which held that an English husband, who periodically
dressed up as a woman, was not guilty of cruelty even though
his wife had suffered a nervous breakdown upon each dis-
covery of his avocation, because he had always tried to hide
his idiosyncrasy to protect her; or Willan v. JJillan27 in which
a wife's cruelty consisted of insisting upon sexual intercourse
with her husband
"h . . . at times when he did not wish to have it-obliging
him to conform to her wishes by indulging in various types of
violence to bend his will to hers. In particular, it was said that
she would pull his hair, catch hold of him by the ears and shake
his head violently to and fro; and at any rate, on one occasion,
* . .she kicked him on his injured leg, causing him great pain.
She would also pester him far into the night to have sexual
intercourse, so that eventually he was compelled to comply as the
only means of getting his rest.''28
The Court of Appeal held that the husband had condoned the
cruelty by having intercourse with his wife the night before he
left home, evidently on the theory that a husband cannot be
raped.
Perhaps you will be more interested in other reasons why
the "traditional" casebook must be rejected. The second count
of the indictment, then, should read that such exercises have
little, if any, relation to the real world in which we live and in
which the law students will practice their profession.
In the first place, it is literally impossible to convince
students-even those who have not worked in a law firm and
23. Minn. Stat. §617.14 (1961).
24. See Baker, "Legislative Crimes," 23 .Minn. L. Rev. 135, 141 (1939).
25. Williams v. State, 64 Ind. 553 (1878).
26. [1960] 1 Weekly L. R. 590 (C.A.).
27. [1960] 1 Weekly L. R. 624 (C.A.).
28. Id. at 625.
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seen how a divorce is actually handled-that the law in
appellate court opinions is really the law in action. Small
wonder-it has hardly anything to do with it. Recrimination,
condonation by intercourse, the standard formulation of what
constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment-all of these are in-
teresting oddities found in contested cases and in Family Law
casebooks; neither source commonly affords guidance to a
well-run law partnership. I am not arguing that these doc-
trines are irrelevant; only that their importance to law practice
is sufficiently marginal for most purposes that we should
enlighten the student as to other matters as well. Professor
Kahn-Freund, recognizing that "only the exceptionally ab-
normal case" is decided by an appellate court, cautioned that
to teach Family Law in terms of "case law" is "to act like a
professor of medicine who not only teaches pathology to
students knowing nothing about the anatomy or physiology
of the healthy body, but who teaches pathology in terms of the
rarest diseases. ' 29
Most important for our purposes, the real world does
contain difficult and absorbing "legal" problems: policy prob-
lems about the proper legal controls for the going family (such
as those relating to support, intra-family torts, adoption,
abortion, artificial insemination) ; about the controls for the
creation and destruction of the family unit; for the relations
of its members with outsiders; problems, also, about the proper
legal sanctions for pre-martial sexual expression; about the
proper procedures to be utilized in applying the controls and
sanctions, or even in selecting those which should apply. These
are the stuff of which law school courses are typically made;
moreover, they require the kind of analysis which tradition
informs us makes good lawyers. But these problems cannot
be solved simply 'by reference to appellate court opinions:
quite frequently the issues have not yet been decided; and if
the discussion is to avoid "the danger of degenerating into an
enumeration of meaningless abstractions, ' 30 the relevant ma-
terials must 'be non-legal.
Some examples of the problems ignored by the traditional
,casebook will illustrate my thesis. The proper method of
trying custody disputes is a matter of current concern to judges,
lawyers, often to legislatures, around the country. Under
29. Kahn-Freund, "Observations on the Possible Cooperation of Teachers of
Law and Teachers of Social Science in Family Law," 9 1. Legal Ed. 76 (1956).
30. Ibid.
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what circumstances should a judge order an extra-record
investigation by a social worker, and with what safeguards?
Neither the student nor the judge can decide such a problem
solely by reference to the few relevant appellate decisions-
even if they were found in the traditional casebook. Its solu-
tion depends, rather upon whether an intelligent decision can
be made without extra-record aid, upon a judgment about the
background and training which a social worker brings to the
assignment, and upon a judgment about the values of an open
and adversary hearing, whatever its consequences. These
underlying questions can be answered only by examining a
host of non-legal premises: what is the training of a social
worker; how unbiased can the report be; what is the quality
of reports which have been utilized in such disputes in the
past; how important is an open hearing; what are its risks?
Another example is afforded by the current cry for a
Family Court as a means of solving all of the problems of
marriage break-up in our society."' It is impossible, of course,
to assess the value of this instrument if the casebook doesn't
mention it at all. In any case, how can we make judgments
about the relative merits of voluntary marriage counseling
services as a branch of the court, 2 the "therapeutic approach,"'3
the conciliation court method,3 4 without examining more than
strictly legal material. One example should suffice. Judge
Pfaff, of the Los Angeles Conciliation Court claims that his
conciliation agreement "utilizes a technique entirely in keeping
with the most advanced thinking in the psychiatric field" ;35 to
be sure, if he is correct we should all be promoting the adoption
of his ideas. But we need information of a non-legal variety
to determine whether it is of any value to a recently estranged
and reconciled couple to sign a reconciliation agreement which
affords "a blueprint for successful living."38 A typical term
of the agreement provides:
The wife agrees to respond to the husband's efforts in
love-making and not act like a patient undergoing a physical
31. See, e.g., Alexander, "Let's Get the Embattled Spouses Out of the,
Trenches," 18 Law & Conlemp. Prob. 98 (1953).
32. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, "The Utah Marriage Counseling Experiment: Art
Account of Changes in Divorce Law and Procedure," 7 Utah L. Rev. 443 (1961).
33. See Rheinstein, "The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Sta--
bility," 9 Vand. L. Rev. 633, 635 (1956).
34. See Pfaff, "The Conciliation Court of Los Angeles County, 1960," A.B.A.
section of Family Law Proceedings 35.
35. Pfaff, "The Conciliation Court of Los Angeles County," 8, May 15, 1961-
36. Ibid.
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examination. For the husband to acquire proficiency in making
intercourse pleasurable to the wife, he must learn to relax
physically and take his time. To do so, he should not be ab-
sorbed in himself, but rather in seeing to it that his wife is duly
responding. The ultimate in his pleasure should be the realiza-
tion that his wife also has enjoyed complete satisfaction.37
A rational choice may be made only if we are willing to study
statistics as to the results achieved by the Conciliation Court
and other Family Courts (and, of course, many of the relevant
statistics have never been released) ; if we will seek those
statistics when they are not available; and finally, if we ask
some astute questions of, and examine astutely the answers
given by, people who spend their professional lives studying
the interaction between husbands and wives-psychiatrists,
psychologists, social workers, marriage counselors.3 8
Consider also the impact upon legal doctrine of the bur-
geoning, but nonetheless quite limited, ability of psychiatrists
to understand, predict and modify human behavior. A recent
New Jersey opinion intimated that a wife's homosexual con-
duct might be "extreme cruelty per se;1139 there was no discussion
of the possibility that she should not have 'been held responsible
for such conduct. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that
it would be barbarous to grant a husband a divorce for his
wife's adultery if her conduct were the product of insanity;40
without any indication that thought was given to the problem,
the court adopted the McNaghton rule4 1 as a standard for
determining the sanity issue.42 The Court of Appeal has just
denied a wife a divorce from a husband who has suffered
psychotic delusions and has -been a mental patient for the
last ten years; the defendant had continually nagged and
criticized his wife, and searched the house for partners in
her adultery whose existence and location were communicated
37. Ib. at 19.
38. It is probable that we will have to formulate and execute joint research
with members of other professions in order to obtain even the preliminary
answers to these questions and a host of others. See, e.g., Foote, supra, n. 13, at
81-82; Kalven, supra, n. 12, at 98. See generally Cohen, Robson and Bates,
Parental Authority: The Community and the Law (1958).
39. H. v. H., 59 N.J. Super. 227, 236, 157 A.2d 721, 726 (1959). The court
actually decided that "the required harmful effect of defendant's behavior has
been sufficiently established." Ibid. Nonetheless, the opinion talks about the
conduct and the "presumptive effect of homosexuality upon a normal spouse" in
such a way that the reader is left with the impression that few plaintiffs will be
denied a divorce if thy succeed in proving their spouses' homosexuality. Id. at
237, 157 A.2d at 727.
40. Manley v. Manley, 193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d 113 (1960).
41. McNaghton Case, 10 C. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
42. Manley v. Manley, 193 Pa. Super. 252, 264, 164 A.2d 113, 120 (1960).
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to him by his "voices." Nonetheless, the husband was not
responsible, although he understood "the nature and conse-
quences of his acts" because, under the second branch of the
McNaghton rule, he did not know that his conduct was wrong.43
Certainly, the psychiatrists have had much to say about the
McNaghton rule's validity in testing criminal responsibility;
it is much more difficult, I think, to justify its application in
deciding whether a divorce should be granted. It is hardly
adequate to point out that "there is a sharp conflict between
law and medicine," as do Jacobs & Goebel;" and the student
can make no reasoned evaluation of the problem without some
awareness of psychiatric insights about people whose emotional
disturbances involve their spouses in one way or another.
Let me offer one more example. We expect the law
student, portraying the legislator, to examine a fairly common
social problem-the rights and duties of people who present
themselves to a court with an existing (frequently just ended),
family-type arrangement in which the man and woman are
not married. Is it sufficient to examine whether this man and
this woman "really intended" to consider themselves married,
or said magic words which create a "common law marriage"?
These questions have been considered adequate even though
the legal issue may have 'been a woman's claim to workmen's
compensation for an injury done to a man with whom she
lived for twenty years and whose six children she must feed
and clothe. But if these are sterile questions-as I earnestly
believe them to be-we must then seek the proper materials
of a better approach.4" It is natural, I think, and essential, to
look to the sociologists, perhaps to the social workers in wel-
fare agencies, to determine how prevalent the difficult case is.
If statistics, or even estimates, are available, we should obtain
them; and we owe a duty to our students to present them for
their consideration.4 6 Instead, the tradition book offers us
cases such as Grigsby v. Reib4 7 where the housemother of a
group of prostitutes was denied the estate of a man who had
43. Williams v. Williams, [1962] 3 All. E. R. 442 (C.A.).
44. Jacobs and Goebel, op. cit., supra, n. 3, at 164. The editors made the
statement in the course of a discussion about whether an insane spouse may obtain
an annulment if the marriage ceremony took place during a "lucid interval." The
criticism, it seems to me, is no less apropos of the treatment of insanity as a
defense to a divorce action is equally cursory. Id. at 435.
45. See generally Weyrauch, "Informal and Formal Marriage-An Appraisal
of Trends in Family Law Organization," 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 88 (1960).
46. See n. 38 supra.
47. Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S.W. 1124 (1913).
[Vol. 3
1963] NON-LEGAL MATERIALS IN FAMILY LAW 147
"agreed" to be her husband; the couple's cohabitation had not
been "professedly as husband and wife, and public, so that, by
their conduct toward each other, they . . . [were] known as
husband and wife ...,,49
This is hardly the end of our responsibility to law students
-even if we seek only to introduce them to their responsibilities
as lawyers. In a seminar I run, each student interviews a divorce
client while the other students observe. One of the clients
convinced herself during the interview that she was being silly
and should go home and reconcile with her husband. At this
point, the advice she sought was what to do about the marriage
counselor she was consulting, since he had advised her that
the only proper action was to obtain a divorce. The student
had no idea what to say to her, nor any idea how to handle
the marriage counselor when he finally spoke to him. This
incident merely illustrates a truth which every recent graduate
discovers with his first domestic -relations case: his tasks as a
lawyer require familiarity with the terminology, the methods
and the roles of a whole host of non-legal experts who are
sure to cross his path.49 Imagine the lawyer for parents in a
Juvenile Court parental termination proceeding who cannot
appreciate the significance of the testimony of a psychiatrist
or a social worker that the child is "emotionally neglected."
Can the unprepared lawyer perform his task in a custody
dispute when a social worker prepares a report which claims
that his client would "over-protect" the child? Suppose the
investigator reports that the client's spouse is a paranoid
schizophrenic but should be given custody of the children
anyway? No one who has any contact with the practice of
domestic relations cases would deny that encounters with pro-
fessionals from other disciplines occur with increasing fre-
quency. And an adequately trained lawyer, it seems to me, is
one whose academic training has included at least some intro-
duction to the problems he is likely to face in practice. Need-
less to say, there is occasional dissent from the practicing
48. Id. at 608, 153 S.W. at 1130. It is possible, of course, that the case
illustrates the not atypical method by which appellate courts reach the correct
results despite inadequacies in the justifications offered in their opinions. Indeed,
on this theory the case permits an instructive class discussion. Without engaging
in extended jurisprudential or pedagogical theorizing, however, it seems to me
that the case is not capable of such an interpretation, nor very useful for such
classroom analysis. In any case, the need for statistics is not obviated.
49. See generally National Council an Legal Clinics, Education for Professional
Responsibility in the Law School-Preliminary Reports on Seven Experimental
Projects (1962).
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bar; one attorney's response to my seminar's efforts in this
direction was typical: "We know little enough about Domestic
Relations after we have passed the Bar. Often times our
judgment may be better than a Welfare Worker or psychi-
atrist. We get fed enough of that stuff in everyday life, but
I don't want too much of it to get into students' minds that
advise people in trouble." ' It is unlikely that the trend will
be reversed - whatever the law professors teach.
Enough of the strictly practical and pragmatic. We can-
not ignore the truth, expressed in a variety of ways and on
innumerable occasions, that "law is nothing more than a form
of social control intimately related to those social functions
which are the subject matter of . . . . the social sciences gen-
erally."5' Justice Brennan's comment is typical: ". . . legal
scholarship must . . . be nourished by all the disciplines that
comprehend the totality of human experience. ' 52 This is nei-
ther a new idea, nor is it restricted to the study of Domestic
Relations. In the contracts course we examine the conditions
under which a 'manifestation of intent should be enforceable
by legal process; and, typically but not solely, we inquire as to
the needs of businessmen and the business community. Until
recently, however, the inquiry was academic even if the ori-
entation was broader. Now Professor McCauley is trying to
discover to what extent businessmen consider "deals" binding
whether or not the courts will enforce them.5" For almost every
subject of our curricula, law professors are investigating em-
pirically what is going on in the real world they constantly dis-
cuss. Studies of procedural devices to avoid delay, damage
awards in personal injury actions, devices to control the jury,
police practices, exercise of the prosecutor's discretion, are
commonly announced and reported in the law reviews and at
these meetings. 4 The legal rules and social practices covered
50. Letter from Chairman of Minnesota Bar Association Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of Law, quoting a letter from an unnamed member, Nov. 1,
1961.
51. Stone, "The Future of Legal Education," 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 234 (1924),
quoted in Currie, "The Materials of Law Study III," 8 1. Legal Ed. 1, 21 (1955).
52. Brennan, Law and Social Science Today 6 (1957), quoted in Donnelly,
"Some Comments Upon the Law and Behavioral Science Program at Yale, 12 1.
Legal Ed. 83, 90 (1959).
53. See Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law, Report, 14 (1962).
54. See, eog., Zeisel, Kal'en and Buchholz, Delay in The Court: An Analysis
of the Remedies for Delayed Justice (1959); Lenin and Woolley, Dispatch and
Delay: A Field Study of Judicial Administration (1961); Cohen, Robson and
Bates, op. cit., supra, n. 38; Rosenberg & Chanin, "Auditors in Massachusetts as;
Antidotes for Delayed Civil Courts," 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 27 (1961); Franklin Chanin
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by a typical domestic relations course have been subjected to
more empirical inquiry than any other subject in which law-
yers are interested. Indeed, we are inundated with data of at
least some relevance. With this material it is possible, perhaps,
to give students an understanding of the legal rules in con-
text- how they conform to societal practices, to our present
institutions, to the historical and projected future modifications
in these institutions. I am not suggesting the empirical data
should be the ultimate authority for either judicial or legis-
lative decision-making. It is one thing to find out whether
most people consider an oral contract binding; it is quite an-
other to recommend repeal of the Statute of Frauds. But "a
well-rounded and integrated professional education . . . . pre-
paring 'professional students for effective citizenship and culti-
vated living . . . -"" should include some understanding of
more than legal rules. If you are willing to accept this premise,
your teaching materials must include some of the data and de-
scription necessary for such an understanding.
Finally, there is something to be said for giving the stu-
dents an even more liberal education - to make them better
lawyers by helping them to become wiser human beings. It is
,especially important, it seems to me, for the attorney who
will handle those most intimate human problems which make
up domestic relations cases to have some understanding of what
makes people act the way they do, why the lawyer reacts the
way he does to other people, to their problems, to their meth-
ods of describing and responding to them. Call the endeavor
"Human Relations Training" as Howard Sacks does," or
education "about people" as Dean Griswold has referred to
it, 57 or even "training for professional responsibility" which
the National Council on Legal Clinics seems to prefer" -
but whatever the problem of nomenclature, it seems clear that
and Mark, "Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Per-
sonal Injury Litigation," 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1961).
55. Smith, "The Education of Professional Students for Citizenship," in Edu-
,cation for Professional Responsibility, 188, 203 (1948), quoted in Currie, supra,
n. 51, at 21 n. 70.
56. Sacks, "Human-Relations Training for Law Students and Lawyers," 11
J. Legal Ed. 316 (1959). See n. 58 infra.
57. Address by Dean Erwin Griswold, 37 Chi. B. Record 199, 203 (1956),
quoted in Sacks, supra, n. 56, at 317. See n. 58 infra.
58. Sacks, "Education for Professional Responsibility: The National Council
on Legal Clinics," 46 A.B.A.!. 1110 (1960). This is not to suggest that the only
concern of the National Council, or of Professor Sacks and Dean Griswold, is the
kind of education described in the text. Many other objectives might also be
phrased. See Sacks, supra, at 1111-12.
JOURNAL OF FdMILY LAW
the endeavor is important and certainly worth experimenting
with. If there is to be experimentation, it must be with mate-
rials which are new and primarily non-legal.
H
I hope that I have proved that non-legal materials are a
necessity; I have yet to establish that their use is perilous.
Initially, a disclaimer is necessary. I am not one of those con-
ventional law teachers Currie describes whose
"original response to the demand for integration of law and the
social sciences had been to approve the idea in principle and to
take shelter in its unworkability .... After Professor Jacobs and
his colleagues with prodigious effort. . . had provided an answer
of sorts to such questions ... the response from the same type of
teacher was, not that the wrong materials were provided; not that
they were not enlightening; but that they should merely be cited,
and not put right between the covers of a coursebook, where they
could demand attention from students and instructors." 59
I think I have already said enough to indicate that I am com-
mitted to hazarding the risks incident to obtaining a usable
product.
But there are problems with using non-legal materials.
They require time, and lots of space. We must recognize that
the time devoted to other matters permits that much less time
to make the student an adequate craftsman in Family Law
doctrines; and we need only look at any set of briefs filed in
any state Supreme Court to see that more craftsmanship would
not be amiss. Moreover, there has been a running battle be-
tween those who believe that only the conclusions of any
relevant empirical data should be included, 60 and those who
believe that conclusions alone preclude "a student's compara-
tive evaluation of the research methods of the various disci-
plines and grossly oversimplify the problem of law-science
interaction by giving 'no hint of the arduous process of rational
analysis, the search for relevant data, and the complicated
statistical techniques that enter into' such research."'" I tend
to sympathize with the latter position, for what it's worth to
you, but this view makes the problem of space even more seri-
59. Currie, supra, n. 51, at 36.
60. Ibid. Vernier, Book Review, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 732, 733 (1934).
61. Foote, "The Law and Behavioral Science Project at the University of
Pennsylvania: Family and Criminal Law," 11 1. Legal Ed. 80, 84 (1958), quoting
Slesinger, Book Review, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 659, 660 (1934).
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ous. The first edition of the Harper book,62 for example, gave
such short shrift to many of the essentials of an introduction
to the lawyer's technical tasks that its utility to a group of
law students was questionable - no matter how imaginative
and enlightening the collection of non-legal materials was. An
explanation to law students of some of the basic insights of
psychiatry, in a form which is at once intelligible and useful,
has not as yet been satisfactorily accomplished.6 3
Nor can the problem of quality be ignored. Much of the
so-called sociological material on the family can only be la-
belled humbug. How can a student, asked to examine the prob-
lem of paternity actions, consider seriously such contributions
to the literature as the following comment on Berry v. Chap-
lin :64
As a matter of cold biological fact, the defendant in the
Chaplin case was not the father. But in view of the circum-
stances, it does not seem unjust to require him to contribute to
the infant's support. It was mere chance which rendered some-
one else the actual father, rather than any discretion or restraint
on the part of the defendant. The defendant was eminently able
to contribute .... Further, the defendant was within the grasp
of the court, whereas it appears that the other putative fathers
were not; so for practical purposes, either the defendant was the
father or no father could be obtained. 65
Moreover, it is an enormous task to find materials of rele-
vance; others have indicated that this is not from a failure to
cull the literature, but rather because "sociology, psychology,
62. Harper, Problems of the Family (1st ed. 1952).
63. For some of the problems see Watson, "The Law and Behavioral Science
Project at the University of Pennsylvania: A Psychiatrist on the Law Faculty," 11
1. Legal Ed. 73, 74 (1958). In 1958 Dr. Watson indicated that "materials which
have been used in this seminar [at the University of Pennsylvania Law School) ...
are fast approaching publication readiness." Ibid. In December, 1962, Dr. Watson
told the author that he hopes to have the materials ready for use by other teachers
.very soon." The author and two psychiatrists, consultants to a project at the
University of Minnesota Law School, supported by a grant from the National
Council on Legal Clinics, are currently seeking to develop such materials. The
task is not an easy one. Whether it is possible at all to teach, even at a very
primitive level, "a general theory of normal psychological functioning" (ibid.)
without the collaboration of a psychiatrist as instructor is doubtful - at least at
this stage of our experience.
64. Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App.2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946).
65. Mumford, "Disregard of Scientific Proof by Juries," 41 J. Crim. L., C. &
P.S. 320, 324-25 (1950). The comment in the text is unfair to Mr. Mumford. His
essay simply argues that a properly functioning judicial system has room for jury
verdicts which disregard scientific proof. To this extent, at least, his thesis is
not unlike an argument the teacher or a student might make in examining the
Chaplin case. Perhaps it would be more proper to say that if we are to have
material in addition to the cases, the contributions should be realistic examinations
of current legal standards and the implications, and values, of alternatives.
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and psychiatry are concerned with their own structure, theories
and methodological problems which tend to be far removed
from the day-to-day problem-solving pressures of legal admin-
istration. '66 It is not impossible, of course, that the researchers
have not provided "answers" useful to lawyers because the
lawyers have taken neither the time nor the trouble to enlighten
them as to their needs, or to prove to them that the research
can fit with the researchers' interests and disciplines. But we
need not pursue solutions here; it is enough to recognize the
problems. Equally noticeable is the not yet resolved (perhaps
never to -be resolved) disagreement between the experimental-
ist and the clinician as to the relative merits of statistical or
case-by-case observational methods.68 I think I see some signs
of a future rapprochement between the two. At Minnesota
the graduate students in Clinical Psychology attend the medical
school courses in psychiatry and each patient is given the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory; the medical
students at least act as if it has something to teach them about
their tasks. Again, it is enough merely to point out that this
problem requires some compromise in the formulation of non-
legal materials for the Family Law course - a compromise
which is likely to satisfy neither side even as it results in an
enormous expansion of the necessary reading material.
The quality of the non-legal materials included in a
Family Law course, and even the decision to include them,
is influenced, I think, by two tendencies which bear repetition
here -if only to emphasize that care should .be taken to
avoid them. One is a certain kind of dilettantism. If it is
the fashionable thing to incorporate non-legal materials, some
nascent casebook editor (or, perhaps, law-science cooperation-
ist) says to himself, then I shall not be left behind. I am not
pointing a finger, understand, but only trying to indicate that
the results of such a attitude must always be a disappointing
product, as well as a set-back for those who would like to see
a reasonable compromise between the traditionalists and the
cooperationists. The other tendency is the more than usual
interest that Family Law teachers profess and maintain in psy-
chiatry. Dr. Andrew Watson, a psychiatrist with substantial
66. Foote, supra, n. 61, at 81. See also Donnelly, supra, n. 52, at 86.
67. See Foote, supra, n. 61, at 82; Kalven, "Some Comments on the Law and
Behavioral Science Project at the University of Pennsylvania," 11 1. Legal Ed. 94,
97 (1958).
68. See Foote, supra, n. 61, at 85.
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experience in the kind of endeavor we are discussing, had
this to say:
We now assume in psychiatry that most of us are led into this
specialty, among other reasons, by the unconscious hope of work-
ing out private emotional problems in the guise of our profes-
sional endeavors .... We should anticipate, then, that lawyers
interested in this work will share, to at least some degree, this
unconscious emotional motivation.6 9
I would no more disparage this motivation than would Dr.
Watson ;70 I mention it only to indicate that it is not difficult
for an editor to forget or ignore the primary reasons why
psychiatric literature is being introduced into his materials;
he might embark instead on a splendid psychiatric endeavor
which is an unreasonable imposition on his own teaching abil-
ity and his students' time and capacity. Again, I would not
point an accusing finger - even if I knew of such a case.
Perhaps our major concern should be with whether all
of this non-legal material can be taught in the typical law
school intellectual environment. For me, the answer is not
an easy one - although I have not yet given up trying and
do not expect to.7 1
I do not mean to engage in what has been called arro-
gant "critical skepticism '1 2 about the state of behavioral sci-
entific research. But no matter how accurate the non-legal data
or valid the conclusions, coordinating the case law method with
some non-platitudinous class discussion of non-legal materials
is not a task for those who discourage easily. As a matter of
fact, almost the only way to revivify one's courage is to use a
traditional book from time to time and rediscover how de-
pressing it can be to discuss social policy with this as back-
ground. I am not the first to discover "that student interest
is directly proportioned to the tightness with which the . . .
data can be integrated with concrete legal problems.17 3 Anthro-
69. Watson, supra, n. 63, at 76.
70. Ibid.
71. I would not ignore Professor Kalven's concern that we commonly operate
with the mistaken premise that "the only test of relevance of research in the law
school world is whether you can teach it." Kalven, supra, n. 66, at 98. If the
argument was simply for more research regardless of its immediate utility to our
courses, I can wholeheartedly concur. But teaching materials present a separable
problem. It seems to me essential to utilize teaching methods, and thus materials,
which will stimulate students' thinking in the classroom and in the future; above
all, students must be kept engaged enough to be willing to continue their efforts
to learn. With unteachable materials, we have lost before we start.
72. Kalven, supra, n. 66, at 96.
73. Foote, supra n. 61, at 85. See also n. 74 inlra.
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pological information, for example, is far removed from the
students' usual legal experience. It might be interesting to
learn that among the Dobuans, intercourse with the mother is
not seriously regarded if the father is dead ;74 but since such
data is of marginal utility for even the broadest view of the
family and domestic relations legal doctrine, I think it would
be best to forego the effort.7 5
The difficulties are magnified by ambivalence about be-
havioral scientific material. Harry Kalven commented that the
law "seems to be simultaneously skeptical and unbelievably
gullible.1 76 Law students are not exempt. We are continually
faced with "faith in psychiatric and other behavioral science
expertise . . . ", on the one hand, and "anxiety" because
"psychiatric materials so inevitably cause one to identify one-
self with the subject matter . . . ,,"7 on the other. However
the ambivalence is described, it can be felt in the class and
must be overcome if the materials are to be useful. It is my
current opinion that the problem, at least in an introductory
course with a large class, is insoluble; some psychiatrists with
whom I have spoken believe that a series of carefully con-
ceived and appropriately delivered lectures might be suc-
cessful.
The enormous difficulties of interdisciplinary communica-
tion add to the confusion. I remember wanting to examine the
problems of contested divorce actions and court procedures
for them; I had mimeographed Edmund Bergler's essay "Six
Types of Neurotic Reaction to a Husband's Request for a
Divorce. ' 79 But the lack of an adequate explanation of the
frequent references to oedipal conflicts and other psychiatric
terminology effectively deprived the excerpts of any real value
for the students. To be frank, I can't be sure that Mr. Berg-
ler was communicating precisely what he intended even to
the teacher.
The Bergler material illustrates another, and perhaps
the most serious, difficulty. For lack of a better term let me
call it "focus." For a 'lawyer's use, much behavioral data and
74. Harper, op. cit., supra, n. 62, at 9.
75. Note the experience at Yale Law School. Schwartz, "The Law and Be-
havioral Science Program at Yale: A Sociologist's Account of Some Experiences,"
12 1. Legal Ed. 91, 97 (1959).
76. Kalven, supra, n. 66, at 96.
77. Foote, supra, n. 61, at 82.
78. Watson, supra, n. 63, at 74.
79. 8 Mar. & Fam. Living 81 (1946).
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opinion is generalized, undifferentiated, too unrelated to the
problems he must discuss in class or think about at home.
Bergler's six neurotic women don't seem very relevant to what
a lawyer can do for a flesh and blood woman who sits in his
office (even if the classroom hypothetical or the problem in
the materials puts a good deal of meat on her bones). Kubie's
interesting analysis of neurotic interaction in marriage8 is
similarly separated from the real-life problems of divorce pol-
icy. Jacobs and Angell recognized the problem in 193081 and
I am sure that most of you have experienced this frustration
with non-legal materials. Professor Kalven commented: "In
the handling of psychoanalytic materials . . . the evidence pre-
sented publicly is curiously dream-like, symbolic, terribly dif-
ferent from what it must have been like when it was re-
ceived." 8 2 This is not simply to object to the material because
the behavioral sciences have not fashioned "their resources
in order to answer the specific needs of the law . . . ." I can
understand and sympathize with the absence of focused material
-but I cannot ignore the pedagogical problem it poses. I have
tried to solve the problem by developing individual case files-
adoption records from welfare agencies, files and transcripts
from Juvenile Court and divorce cases, the working files of
social workers in custody investigations. I try to build into these
files, which already include much reference to or reliance upon
behavioral scientists, explanatory material and other data
which seems important to an intelligent examination of the
case. This seems to help; I don't think it is a panacea.
We are left only with the ultimate problem: are the risks
too great, the perils too ominous? I cannot answer the ques-
tion for you; I can only indicate, as I have before, that my
own plan is to continue to try to use non-legal materials be-
cause I think the possible gains are well worth the risks. There
are some methods of avoiding heartache: it seems unwise to
me to try to develop your own materials quickly and without
care- in an effort to get something, anything, in addition to
the traditional cases; it seems better to indoctrinate the stu-
dents with a transcript which includes, perhaps, a problem in
psychiatric diagnosis, rather than with some experimental data
80. Kubie, "Psychoanalysis and Marriage," in Neurotic Interaction in Marriage
10 (Eisenstein ed. 1956).
81. See Jacobs, Cases on Family Law, vii-viii (1933).
82. Kalven, supra, n. 66, at 97.
83. Cohen, "Factors of Resistance to the Resources of the Behavioral Sciences,"
12 1. Legal Ed. 67, 68 (1959).
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or sociological essay, because the transcript will be less re-
moved from the world in which the students are comfortable;
I think I am satisfied that it is not essential in an introductory
course to accomplish the maximum in behavioral science inte-
gration; I suspect that a small group seminar is the only setting
in which major progress is likely to be made.
Perhaps it would not be improper for this speech to end,
as many do, with a fervent plea that my own experiments
should be adopted. I can't really argue that thesis - but I
can report that at Minnesota we are making an effort to in-
corporate non-legal learning not only in an academic exercise,
but by means of clinical devices. In seminar sessions which fol-
low each divorce interview, two psychiatrists and I make a
rather primitive effort with group therapy of a sort. By focus-
ing on the student's interview, on his response to the client
and the client's response to him, we try to give students some
basic insights of psychiatry which should be helpful to any
practicing attorney. At the same time, the class explores to-
gether each student's reactions in a situation which frequently
produces anxiety.
The risks in the endeavor are substantial; some of them
have been suggested in the budding literature in the Journal
of Legal Education.8
Conclusion
Because of necessity, the length of this paper is limited
and therefore I have not completely analyzed the risks, nor
have I described the program in great detail. What I have
tried to do is present the problem and set forth in general
outline form my views concerning the proper way to approach
the solution.
84. See Katz, "The Law and Behavioral Science Program at Yale: A Psychi-
atrist's First Impressions," 12 1. Legal Ed. 99, 101 (1959); Watson, supra, n. 63,
at 73-75.
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